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Recent empirical work ￿nds that R&D expenditures are quite procyclical, even for ￿rms
that are not credit-constrained during downturns. This has been taken as strong evidence
against Schumpeterian-style theories of business cycles that emphasize the idea that downturns
in production may be good times to allocate labor towards innovative activities. Here we argue
that the procyclicality of R&D investment is, in fact, quite consistent with at least one of these
theories. In our analysis, we emphasize three key features of R&D investment relative to other
types of innovative activity: (1) it uses knowledge intensively, (2) it is a long-term investment
with uncertain applications and (3) it suﬀers from diminishing returns over time.
This paper has bene￿tted from the comments of seminar participants at NYU. Funding
from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and the Canadian
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Empirical evidence suggests that R&D expenditures in the US and other OECD economies are
pro￿cyclical. This evidence appears to run counter to recent theories which have revived the
Schumpeterian notion that economic downturns play an important role in promoting long run
productivity growth. In this article we demonstrate that, in fact, the pro￿cyclical behavior of
R&D is quite consistent with at least one of these theories. Our analysis emphasizes the fact that
R&D is just one part of a multi￿stage innovative process by which basic discoveries are eventually
translated into productivity improvements. We show that the inherent uncertainty regarding the
timing and eventual application of new ideas implies that R&D investment naturally exhibits
very diﬀerent business cycle properties to other forms of innovative activity.
The notion that downturns may induce greater R&D spending, is often associated with the im-
pact of negative shocks in Schumpeterian endogenous growth models. By lowering wages, negative
shocks reduce the opportunity costs of innovative eﬀort and induce higher long term productivity
growth (see Aghion and Saint Paul (1998) for a survey). A number of recent theories of ￿endoge-
nous growth cycles￿ imply the economy alternates between phases of high productivity growth
and high ￿xed capital formation and phases of low productivity growth, but intensive R&D (e.g.
Bental and Peled (1996), Matsuyama (1999, 2001) and W￿lde (1999, 2001). However, because
they feature no absolute downturns in economic activity and/or are single￿sector models, it is
diﬃcult to relate these theories to the actual business cycle. In contrast, Francois and Lloyd-Ellis
(2003) develop a multi￿sector Schumpeterian paradigm in which expansions and absolute down-
turns are an intrinsic part of the long￿term growth process. Expansions re￿ect the endogenous,
clustered implementation of productivity improvements (as in Shleifer, 1986), and recessions are
the negative side￿product of the restructuring that anticipates them.1
Most empirical evidence on R&D spending appears to run counter to the predictions of these
theories. Looking at aggregate NSF data on R&D spending in the post￿war US, Saint￿Paul
(1993) ￿nds ￿little evidence of pro￿ or countercyclical behavior￿. However, Fatas (2000) docu-
m e n t st h a tg r o w t hi nr e a lR & De x p e n d i t u r e si nt h eU Si sp o s i t i v e l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t hr e a lG D P
growth. Moreover, Barlevy (2005a), focussing only on the growth rate of real R&D expenditures
￿nanced by private industry (NSF data), ￿nds that it tends to be signi￿cantly higher during
periods of rapid economic growth. W￿lde and Woitek (2004) study the cyclical behavior of R&D
expenditures by business enterprises in G7 countries over the period 1973￿2000. On balance, they
also ￿nd stronger evidence in favour of pro￿cyclical rather than countercyclical R&D spending.
1Francois and Lloyd￿Ellis (2006) extend the model to allow for capital accumulation and show how ￿uctuations
in the investment rate support the incentives needed to generate the multi￿sector cycle.
1Recently, a number of theories have been advanced to explain why R&D spending may be pro￿
cyclical. Aghion et al. (2005), for example, show how R&D may fall during recessions because of
tighter credit constraints. However, using Compustat data on the R&D expenditures of publicly
traded companies in the US, Barlevy (2005a) ￿nds that the tendency for R&D growth to fall
during recessions is actually more pronounced in ￿rms that are less likely to be credit constrained.2
Barlevy (2005b) develops a stochastic Schumpeterian growth model in which, although it is
socially optimal for R&D to be concentrated during downturns, short￿term behavior by innovators
r e s u l t si na ni n e ﬃciently counter-cyclical allocation of resources. In a business cycle model with
endogenous R&D spending, Comin and Gertler (2006) ￿nd that exogenous mark￿up shocks can
also induce pro￿cyclical movements in R&D.3
Here, we demonstrate that explicitly introducing R&D into the intrinsic business cycle model
of Francois and Lloyd￿Ellis (2003), as the ￿rst step in a multi￿stage innovative process, implies
that R&D investment inherently evolves in a pro￿cyclical manner.4 Our explanation does not
depend on the existence of tightening credit constraints during downturns nor on short￿term
behavior by innovators. Moreover, it arises in a model in which both the cyclical process and
growth are endogenously determined. Here the pro￿cyclical behavior of R&D is the result of three
assumed characteristics of R&D: (1) its productivity is enhanced by implemented technology, (2)
it is a long￿term investment with uncertain applications and (3) there are diminishing returns to
existing knowledge.
Although it is common to assume that ideas discovered through R&D are immediately trans-
lated into productivity gains, in reality R&D (as typically de￿ned) is just the ￿rst step in the
overall innovative process. According to the oﬃcial OECD de￿nition, R&D is distinguished from
other innovation costs in that it must have ￿an appreciable element of novelty and the resolution
of scienti￿c and/or technological uncertainty.￿ However, as others have argued, this is a rather
narrow de￿nition of innovation. For example, Kamin, Bijaoui and Horesh (1982), Evangelista
et al. (1997) and Baldwin et al. (2004) identify many activities (e.g. product development and
design, product speci￿cation, prototype construction, manufacturing startup and organizational
adjustments) that are crucial for adapting and implementing newly developed technology into
production, but which are not generally classi￿ed as R&D. In all these studies, R&D spending
accounts for less that 50% of the overall costs of innovation.
In the model developed here, we decompose the innovation process into three distinct stages:
R&D, commercialization and implementation (see Figure 1). R&D is modelled as a costly process
2Aghion et al. (2005) do ￿nd cross￿country empirical evidence in support of their theory.
3Tarashima (2005) argues that to resolve the pro￿cyclical R&D puzzle one must abandon the conjecture that
cycles are driven by technology shocks altogether.
4In our earlier work, the implications for the cyclical behaviour of R&D was left unspeci￿ed.
2which generates potentially productive ￿ideas￿ whose exact application and timing thereof (if
ever) is uncertain. We assume that these ideas are patented immediately, even though their
exact application is unknown, so that some share of the return can be reaped by investors. We
use the term commercialization to refer to the process of matching these ideas with particular
applications and adapting them for use. Commercialization is modelled as a form of costly search
by entrepreneurs and/or managers who are motivated by a share of the expected pro￿ts.5 In
particular, the rate at which existing ideas are commercialized depends on this entrepreneurial
search eﬀort. Once commercially￿viable uses have been identi￿ed, they can then be implemented
in production at an optimally chosen date by licensing to intermediate goods producers. The
resulting pro￿ts are divided between investors in R&D and the entrepreneur/managers according









Figure 1: Multi￿stage innovative process
As in Francois and Lloyd￿Ellis (2003), commercialization is concentrated towards the end of
downturns, peaking just prior to the subsequent boom. The very fact that this search activity
intensi￿es during recessions, implies that the value of ideas whose applications have yet to be
determined is maximized at the cyclical peak.6 After this, the value of these ￿unmatched ideas￿
declines temporarily as the likelihood of identifying a commercially viable application before the
next expansion declines. Since the expected cost of obtaining each idea does not also fall, R&D
actually ceases altogether during recessions.7 Following an implementation boom, the interest
5One could interpret these agents more narrowly as venture capitalists.
6Nickell, Nicolitsas and Patterson (2001) ￿nd that many ￿managerial innovations￿ (e.g. changes in structure,
more decentralization, changes in human resources management practices, the implementation of just in time
technologies) are concentrated during in downturns.
7In a model with ￿xed capital formation, R&D would decline but not necessarily fall to zero. See Francois and
3rate rises and the value of unmatched ideas grows as the next phase of intensi￿ed commercial-
ization approaches. This induces increased investment in R&D, causing the stock of potentially
productive knowledge to rise. Due to diminishing returns to existing knowledge, the equilibrium
unit cost of R&D consequently rises with the value of new ideas through the expansion. Thus,
the incentives to undertake R&D move in exactly the opposite way over the cycle to those faced
by entrepreneur/managers engaged in commercialization.
The remainder of the paper is laid out as follows. Section 2 develops the building blocks of
the model. Section 3 posits and describes behavior in the cyclical equilibrium and elaborates the
dynamics over the phases of the cycle. Section 4 derives suﬃcient conditions for existence to be
met. Section 5 demonstrates existence of the equilibrium for various sets of parameter values and
explores the equilibrium￿s qualitative characteristics. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
2.1 Assumptions
There is no aggregate uncertainty. Time is continuous and indexed by t ≥ 0. The economy is











where ρ denotes the rate of time preference and σ is the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal







where w(t) denotes wage income, B(t) denotes the household￿s stock of assets at time t and R(t)
denotes the discount factor from time zero to t.
Final output is produced by competitive ￿rms according to a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion utilizing intermediates, x, indexed by i, over the unit interval:






We let pi denote the price of intermediate i. Final output can be used for consumption, C(t),
investment in R&D, IR(t), or (potentially) stored:
C(t)+IR(t) ≤ Y (t). (4)
Lloyd-Ellis (2006).
4Output of intermediate i depends upon the state of technology in sector i, Ai (t), and the
labor hours, li, according to a simple linear technology:
xs
i(t)=Ai(t)li(t). (5)
Labor receives the equilibrium wage w(t). There is no imitation, so the dominant entrepreneur in
each sector undertakes all production and earns monopoly pro￿ts by limit pricing until displaced
by a higher productivity rival. We assume that intermediates are completely used up in produc-
tion, but can be produced and stored for use at a later date. Incumbent intermediate producers
must therefore decide whether to sell now, or store and sell later.
For simplicity we assume that, wherever they are ultimately used, new ideas always dominate
old ones by a productivity factor eγ. This implies that the total potential productivity of the
stock of existing knowledge can be expressed as Z(t)=eγN(t),w h e r eN(t) is the measure of




















R&D investment is ￿nanced by selling claims to households. This speci￿cation implies that one





θ Z(t) units of investment ￿ eﬀectively there are diminishing returns
to existing ideas. The expected value of the share of claims to such an idea, accruing to investors
in R&D, is denoted by Ω(t).
2.2 The Market for Ideas
Although R&D adds to the stock of potentially productive ideas, these ideas are not immediately
commercially viable. We model the market for these ideas as a one￿sided matching process in
which entrepreneur/managers allocate labor eﬀort to searching amongst the stock of potential
ideas for those that will be commercially viable in a particular application.8 T h er a t eo fs u c c e s so f
this search activity is given by δhi(t), where δ is a parameter, and hi is the labor eﬀort allocated
to search in sector i. At any point in time, entrepreneur/mangers decide whether or not to
allocate labor eﬀort to searching for commercially viable ideas, and if they do so, how much.
8Comin and Gertler (2006) and Paterson (2006) use a related two￿stage framework to capture the delay between
R&D and the adoption of ideas into production. A key diﬀerence here is that, once the commerical viability of an
idea is identi￿ed, there may be a further (strategic) delay before implementation.
5The aggregate labor eﬀort allocated to search is given by H(t)=
R 1
0 hi(t)dt.A s w i t h R & D ,
entrepreneurial search is ￿nanced by selling claims to households.
Entrepreneurs with commercially￿viable innovations must choose whether or not to imple-
ment immediately or delay until a later date. Once they implement, the knowledge of how the
idea can be made commercially viable becomes publicly available, and can be built upon by rival
entrepreneurs. However, prior to implementation, this knowledge is privately held by the entre-
preneur. We let V I
i (t) denote the expected present value of pro￿ts from implementing at time t,
and V D
i (t) denote that of delaying implementation from time t until the most pro￿table time in
the future. It follows that the value of a commercially viable idea is
V ∗
i (t)=m a x [ V D
i (t),VI
i (t)] (7)
Once an idea is implemented in production, the households who ￿nanced R&D receive (1−η)V ∗
i (t)
and those that ￿nanced entrepreneurial search receive ηV ∗
i (t).A si sc o m m o ni nm o d e l so fs e a r c h
and matching, the share parameter η is treated as an exogenous outcome of a bilateral bargaining
process.
It follows that the expected value of a claim to an unmatched idea, Ω(t),d e p e n d so nt h e
eventual payoﬀ, the rate at which the idea is matched with an application and the delay before it
is implemented. The stock S(t) of ￿untapped ideas￿ ￿ ideas emanating from R&D which have
not been matched with a particular application ￿ evolves according to
œ S(t)= œ N(t) − δH(t). (8)
We assume that the ideas which constitute this untapped stock are equally likely to be commer-
cially viable. It follows that the rate at which a given idea is matched is given by δH(t)/S(t).
Note that we have implicitly imposed the assumption that each idea emanating from R&D
has a unique application, so that once it has been matched with a sector, no subsequent matches
can occur. This greatly simpli￿es the exposition, with little loss of generality. The model could
be extended to allow for multiple applications without changing the main results.
2.3 Deﬁnition of Equilibrium
Given an initial stock of implemented innovations represented by a cross￿sectoral distribution of
productivities {Ai(0)}1
i=0 an equilibrium for this economy satis￿es the following conditions:
￿ Households allocate consumption over time to maximize (1) subject (2). The ￿rst￿order con-
ditions of the household￿s optimization require that
C(t)σ = C(s)σeR(t)−R(s)−ρ(t−s) ∀ t,s, (9)
6and that the transversality condition holds: lims→∞ e−R(s)B(s)=0
￿ Final goods producers choose intermediates to maximize pro￿ts. The derived demand for











and the instantaneous pro￿te a r n e di s
πi(t)=( 1− e−γ)Y (t). (12)
Note crucially that ￿rm pro￿ts are proportional to aggregate demand.
￿ Labor market clearing: Z 1
0
li(t)di + H(t)=L (13)
Labor market equilibrium also implies
w(t)(L − H(t)) = e−γY (t) (14)
￿ Free entry into arbitrage. For all assets that are held in strictly positive amounts by households,
the rate of return between time t and time s must equal
R(s)−R(t)
s−t .
￿ There is free entry into search
δηV ∗
i (t) ≤ w(t), hi(t) ≥ 0 with at least one equality, ∀ i (15)
￿ In periods where there is implementation, entrepreneurs with commercially viable ideas must
prefer to implement rather that delay until a later date.
￿ In periods where there is no implementation, either there must be no commercially viable
available to implement, or entrepreneurs must prefer to delay rather than implement.







Z(t),I R(t) ≥ 0 w.a.l.o.e. (16)
￿ The aggregate resource constraint must be satis￿ed:
C(t)+IR(t)=Y (t). (17)
73 The Acyclical Equilibrium Growth path
Although we are mainly concerned with the cyclical equilibrium growth path, it is useful for
comparison purposes to brie￿y consider the stationary growth path of the acyclical equilibrium.
Along this path all commercially￿viable ideas are implemented immediately and aggregates grow
at the same constant rate
ga = δγH. (18)
Consequently, the Euler equation yields a constant interest rate given by
ra = ρ + σga. (19)
Along the balanced growth path, the search no￿arbitrage equation must also hold:




V I . (20)
Along this path, free entry into commercialization requires that
ηδV I(t)=w(t) (21)
and pro￿ts are given by
π(t)=( eγ − 1)(L − H)w(t). (22)
Substituting into (20) using (18), (21) and (22) yields
ra = η(eγ − 1)δL − [η(eγ − 1) + 1 − γ]ga/γ (23)
Assuming γ < 1+η(eγ −1), this equation yields a negative relationship between r and g.T h e
main reason is that a high steady￿state growth rate, g, implies more labor allocated to search
which de￿ates pro￿ts and raises the risk of obsolescence. These tend to oﬀset the positive impact
of higher pro￿t growth. Equating (19) and (23) yields the steady state growth rate
ga = γ
η(eγ − 1)δL − ρ
η(eγ − 1) + 1 − γ(1 − σ)
(24)




















8a n dt h ep r o d u c t i v i t yo fi m p l e m e n t e dk n o w l e d g ec a nb ee x p r e s s e da s
ﬂ A(t)=Z(t)e−γS(t). (27)











Given ra and ga, this equation pins down the steady￿state stock of unmatched ideas, S∗.
Notice that, in this acyclical equilibrium, the R&D sector plays an essential, but largely
supportive role: it produces and maintains a suﬃciently large stock of knowledge to ensure that
the economy grows at the required rate. The parameters of the R&D technology, ￿ and θ,h a v e
no impact on long￿run growth. In eﬀect the role is very similar to that of capital accumulation
in a standard endogenous growth model.
4 The Cyclical Equilibrium Growth Path
Suppose that implementation occurs at discrete dates denoted by Tν where v ∈ {1,2,...,∞}.W e
adopt the convention that the vth cycle starts at time Tv−1 and ends at time Tν.W e d e n o t e
values of variables the instant after implementation by a 0 subscript. After implementation at
date Tv−1, an expansion is triggered by a productivity boom and continues through subsequent
consumption growth. During this phase, commercialization ceases and consequently all labor
eﬀort is used in production. R&D spending is highest during this phase so that the stock of
knowledge grows. At some time T∗
v, search commences and labor starts to be withdrawn from
production. Commercially viable ideas are not implemented immediately but are withheld until
time Tv. During this contraction phase, investment in R&D slows and search continues to
accelerate in anticipation of the subsequent boom. As aggregate demand falls, labor continues to
be released from production into the increased search.
Let Pi(s) denote the probability that, since time Tv−1, no entrepreneurial success has been
made in sector i by time s. It follows that the probability of there being no innovation by time
Tv conditional on there having been none by time t,i sg i v e nb yPi(Tv)/Pi(t). Hence, the value of
an incumbent ￿rm in a sector where no innovation has occurred by time t during the vth cycle













β(t)=R0(Tv) − R(t) (30)
9denotes the discount factor used to discount from time t during the cycle to the beginning of
the next cycle. The ￿r s tt e r mi n( 2 9 )r e p r e s e n t st h ed i s c o u n t e dp r o ￿t stream that accrues with
certainty during the current cycle, and the second term is the expected discounted value of being
an incumbent at the beginning of the next cycle.
Lemma 1 In a cyclical equilibrium, the identi￿cation of commercially viable ideas can be credibly
signalled immediately and all search in that sector stops until the next round of implementation.
If an entrepreneur￿s announcement is credible, other entrepreneurs will exert their search eﬀorts
in sectors where they have a better chance of becoming the dominant entrepreneur. One might
imagine that unsuccessful entrepreneurs would have an incentive to mimic successful ones by
falsely announcing success to deter others from entering the sector. But there is no advantage
to this strategy relative to the alternative of allocating eﬀort to the sector until, with some
probability, another entrepreneur is successful, and then switching to another sector.
In the cyclical equilibrium, entrepreneurs￿ conjectures ensure no more entrepreneurship in
a sector once a signal of success has been received, until after the next implementation. The
expected value of an entrepreneurial success occurring at some time t ∈ (T∗
v,T v) but whose




Since no implementation occurs during the cycle, the entrepreneur implementing at Tv is assured
of incumbency until at least Tv+1. Incumbency beyond that time depends on the probability that
no commercially viable improvement has been identi￿ed in that sector up until then.
The symmetry of sectors implies that innovative eﬀort is allocated evenly over all sectors
that have not yet experienced an innovation within the cycle. Thus the probability of not being










Given the simplifying assumption that all ideas have equal likelihood of being commercialized,
it follows that Ω(t), the value of a claim to a new idea that has yet to be matched with a






(1 − η)V D(t) − Ω(t)
¤
+ œ Ω(t) (33)
Note that since the probability of being matched is no greater than 1, it must be the case that
(1 − η)V D(t) ≥ Ω(t).
105 Within—cycle dynamics
Within a cycle, t ∈ [Tv−1,T v], the state of technology in use is unchanging. The appendix
demonstrates that the producers￿ limit pricing behavior ensures, the wage is also constant during
t h ec y c l ea n di sp i n n e dd o w nb yt h el e v e lo ft e c h n o l o g y :
w(t)=e−γ ﬂ Av−1 (34)
where






Note that the wage is less than its marginal product by a constant factor e−γ,r e ￿ecting the
fact that a fraction 1 − e−γ goes in the form of pro￿ts to intermediate producers. Consequently,
standard aggregation results hold and aggregate output can be expressed as
Y (t)= ﬂ Av−1 [L − H(t)], (36)
In order to aﬀord a stationary representation of the economy, it is convenient to normalize aggre-












Consequently, the intensive form production function is given by
y(t)=L − H(t). (38)

































Figure 2: Phase Diagram
5.1 The Expansion (Tv−1 → T∗
v)
During the expansion all labour is used in the production of consumption goods and R&D,





























These dynamics are illustrated using the phase diagram in Figure 2.
In the equilibrium that we study both consumption and the stock of knowledge grow during
the expansion, so we restrict attention to the left of the œ c =0locus. The economy evolves along
a transition path like AB in Figure 2. Given initial values for consumption and the stock of
knowledge, the dynamical system above therefore yields a unique path for c(t) and z(t) at each
date t during the expansion. In particular, we can describe the path of consumption as
c(t)=F(t; c0(Tv−1),z 0(Tv−1)) ∀ t ∈ [Tv−1,T∗
v], (44)
12where the function F(t;•) is implicitly de￿ned.
As a result of the boom, wages rise rapidly. Since the next implementation boom is some
time away, the present value of allocating a unit of labour eﬀort to search falls below the wage,
δηV D(t) <w (t). During the expansion , the expected value of search, δηV D(t), grows at the rate
of interest, but continues to be dominated by the wage. As a result of ongoing R&D, the stock
of ideas expands. However none of these ideas is matched with a sector, so that




v) for the ￿rst time. If all labor were to remain in production,
the returns to search eﬀort would strictly dominate those in production. As a result, labor eﬀort
is reallocated from production into search, triggering the next phase of the cycle. The following
Lemma demonstrates that during this transition, labor eﬀort shifts rapidly from one activity to
the other:
Lemma 2 : At T∗
v, investment in R&D falls discretely to zero and entrepreneurial search eﬀort
jumps discretely to Hv = H0(T∗
v) > 0.
5.2 The Contraction (T ∗
v → Tv)
During this phase, there is search, so that H(t) > 0. Since there is free entry into search,
w(t)=δηV D(t), and so the value of entrepreneurship, δηV D(t), must be constant. Since the
time until implementation for a successful entrepreneur is falling and there is no stream of pro￿ts








Since H(t) > 0,r (t)=0and (1−η)V D(t) > Ω(t) it follows that the value of claims to unmatched











Since the accumulation of ideas is inherently irreversible (œ z(t) ≥ 0), it follows that during this


















13Intuitively, as the downturn proceeds, the likelihood that a given idea will be matched with a
sector before the subsequent boom declines. Since the interest rate is zero during this phase, the
fact that the boom is getting closer yields no oﬀs e t t i n gg r o w t hi nt h ev a l u e .
Although investment in R&D falls discretely at t = T∗
v, consumption is constant across the
transition between phases because the discount factor does not change discretely. It follows that
the decline in output due to the fall in R&D investment demand must be proportional to the
fraction of labor hours withdrawn from production:
Hv = IR (T∗
v)=L − c(T∗
v). (49)
Lemma 3 : During the downturn the value of an unmatched idea at time t is given by










Since no R&D takes place during the downturn, the stock of potential knowledge remains the
same until the beginning of the subsequent cycle, Z0(Tv)=Z(T∗
v).B u ts i n c eR & Di sp o s i t i v ea t





θ Z0(Tv). Taken together
these facts imply that while the value of claims to R&D falls during the downturn, their increase
at the boom must exactly oﬀset this: Ω(T∗
v)=Ω0(Tv). Combining this with (50) implies the
following:

















Note that it must be the case that γS(T∗
v) > Γv. Since the term in brackets must be less than






θ . This expression is analogous to (28) for the acyclical growth path ￿ given
growth in productivity at the boom, Γv, and the discount factor to the beginning of the next
cycle, β(T∗
v), it pins down the stock of unmatched ideas available at the previous cyclical peak.
Since the economy is closed, it follows once again that, because there is no incentive to store







9Although r =0 , strict preference for zero storage results from arbitrarily small storage costs.
14This occurs during the downturn because labor gradually ￿ows out of production and into search.





v ](L − Hv)). (53)
This, in turn, determines the measure of sectors in which commercially viable ideas are iden-
ti￿ed at each date:
− œ P(t)=δH(t), (54)
where P(T∗
v)=1 .10 At the end of the cycle, the fraction of sectors that have identi￿ed commer-






5.3 The Implementation Boom
We denote the growth in aggregate productivity during the implementation period Tv by Γv =
ln( ﬂ Av/ ﬂ Av−1). Since Γv = γ (1 − P(Tv)), (55) and (53) determine the size of the boom as a function
of the length of the downturn, ∆C
v = Tv − T∗
v:
Γv = δγL∆C









At the beginning of each cycle all labor is used in production. Since output is only augmented
by the increase in aggregate productivity C0(Tv)=eΓvC0(Tv−1). The Euler equation therefore
implies a long run discount factor given by
R0(Tv) − R0(Tv−1)=ρ∆v + σΓv (57)
During the expansion, (41) implies that the discount factor must grow by ln
z(Tv)
z(Tv−1), recalling that
there is no R&D in the recession. During the downturn the interest rate is zero. Combining these
facts with (57), it follows that across the boom the discount factor must satisfy




Over the boom, the asset market must simultaneously ensure that entrepreneurs holding viable
ideas are willing to implement immediately (and no earlier) and that, for households, holding
equity in ￿rms dominates holding claims to alternative assets (particularly stored intermediates).
The following Proposition demonstrates that these conditions imply that during the boom, the
discount factor must equal productivity growth:
10T h er a t eo fc h a n g ei nP is given by
œ P
P = −δhi. But since labor is allocated symmetrically to innovation only
in the measure P of sectors where no innovation has occurred, hi =
H
P ,s ot h a t ˙ P = −δH.
15Proposition 2 : Asset market clearing at the boom requires that
β(Tv)=Γv (59)
Since the interest rate is zero through the downturn it is also the case that β (T∗
v)=Γv and that,








5.4 Optimal Entrepreneurial Behavior
The willingness of entrepreneurs to delay implementation until the boom and to just start engag-
ing in search activities at exactly T∗
v depends crucially on the expected value of monopoly rents,
relative to the current labor costs. This is a forward looking condition: given Γ and ∆C,t h e
present value of these rents depend crucially on the length of the subsequent cycle, Tv+1 − Tv.
Since Lemma 2 implies that entrepreneurship starts at T∗






S i n c et h ei n c r e a s ei nt h ew a g ea c r o s sc y c l e sr e ￿ects only the improvement in productivity:
wv+1 = eΓwv, and since from the asset market clearing conditions, we know that β(T∗
v )=Γ,
it immediately follows that the increase in the present value of monopoly pro￿ts from the begin-





Equation (62) implies that, given some initial implementation period, and stationary values of Γ
and ∆C, the next implementation period is determined. Letting the total cycle length be denoted
∆v = Tv − Tv−1, and the expansion length be denoted ∆X
v ≡ ∆v − ∆C
v we therefore have the
following result:
Proposition 3 Given the boom size, Γv, the contraction length, ∆C
v , and the dynamic path
followed by z(t), there exists a unique expansion length, ∆X
v , such that entrepreneurs are just
willing to commence search, ∆C






















1 − (1 − Γv/γ)e(1−σ)Γv−ρ(∆C
v +∆X
v ) (63)
16The equilibrium conditions on entrepreneurial behavior also impose the following requirements
on our hypothesized cycle:
￿ Successful entrepreneurs at time t = Tv, must prefer to implement immediately, rather than




￿ Entrepreneurs who ￿nd commercially viable ideas during the downturn must prefer to wait
until the beginning of the next cycle rather than implement earlier:
V I(t) <VD(t) ∀ t ∈ (T∗
v,T v) (E2)
￿ No entrepreneur wants to search for commercially viable ideas during the expansionary phase
of the cycle. Since in this phase of the cycle δV D(t) <w (t), this condition requires that
δηV I(t) <w (t) ∀ t ∈ (0,T∗
v) (E3)
￿ Finally, in constructing the equilibrium above, we have implicitly imposed the requirement that
the downturn is not so long that commercially viable applications are identi￿ed in every sector:
P(Tv) > 0. (E4)
6 Stationary Cyclical Equilibrium Growth Path
We focus on a stationary cyclical equilibrium in which the boom in productivity, Γ,a n dt h e
length of each phase of the cycle (∆X,∆C) are constant. Along such a growth path, the potential




= Γ = γ [N(Tv) − N(Tv−1)] (64)
during the expansion, and an equal measure of ideas is matched with a pro￿table application
during downturns. Combining (58), (59) and (64) yields the following implication:








17Thus, long￿run growth along this path is increasing in the rate of time preference and decreasing
in the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This is in sharp contrast to the acyclical growth
path discussed in Section 3. To understand this, consider two key relationships. Firstly, the
consumer￿s Euler equation implies, as usual, that a higher rate of return over the cycle yields a
more rapidly growing consumption path. In equilibrium it follows that
ﬂ g =
ﬂ r − ρ
σ
, (66)
where ﬂ r =[ R(Tv) − R(Tv−1)]/∆ denotes the average interest rate over the cycle.
In the cyclical steady state, the rate of return must be suﬃcient to induce investment in R&D
during the expansion and to induce the ￿nancing of commercialization during the downturn. Both
of these require a rate of return equal to Γ ￿ the former because this is how much the unit cost
of R&D grows during the expansion, and the latter because this ensures that intermediates are
not stored. Since the interest rate during the downturn is zero, it follows that the average rate
of return over the entire cycle required to induce the investment that supports a growth rate ﬂ g
must be given by
ﬂ r =2 ﬂ g. (67)
Note that, in contrast to the acyclical steady￿state, the required average rate of return is unam-
biguously increasing in the average growth rate.
A strong implication of (65) is that the average growth rate is pinned down entirely by the
preference parameters and is independent of the technological parameters, and the economy￿s
size L. Once again, this contrasts starkly with the growth rate in the acyclical equilibrium,
(24), and also contrasts with a recent literature which has endeavoured to construct technology
based endogenous growth models that do not exhibit scale eﬀects. Here, there are no direct scale
eﬀects on long run growth. Note however that changes in the size of the work force and other
technological parameters do eﬀect the length and nature of each phase of the cycle (see below),
and whether or not a cyclical equilibrium exists.
Using (44), (56), (51), (60), (63) and (65), the stationary cyclical equilibrium is fully described
by the vector (Γ,∆X,∆C, ￿ z, ￿ S) and a recurring expansion path for consumption {￿ c(t)}
∆X
τ=0 which




￿ c(∆X),e −Γ￿ z) ∀ τ ∈ [0,∆X] (68)

















γ ￿ S(1 − e−Γ)+Γe−Γ
!

























(2 − σ)Γ = ρ(∆X + ∆C) (72)
Recall that the function F(•) represents the transitional dynamics during the expansion, given by
(42) and (43). Although average growth depends only on preference parameters, technological
parameters in￿uence short￿run growth and the nature of cycles. In order to characterize these
eﬀects, however, we turn to numerical methods.
6.1 Baseline Example
We numerically solve the (68) through (72) for various combinations of parameters and check the
existence conditions (E1)￿(E4). The parameters for our baseline example are given in Table 1.11
The parameter γ implies a labor share of about 0.7. We chose ρ and σ t oy i e l dal o n gr u ng r o w t h
rate of 2% and an average risk￿free real interest rate of 4% (these values roughly correspond to
average data for the post￿war US.). The remaining parameters are chosen fairly arbitrarily, but
imply a cycle length of about 10 years, with an expansion of almost 7 years and a contraction of
just over 3 years.










11The Gauss program used to generate the numerical simulations and the diagrams contained here is downloadable
from the following URL: http://qed.econ.queensu.ca/pub/faculty/lloyd-ellis/research.html
19Figure 3 depicts the evolution of some key aggregates over the cycle. Clearly, R&D in-
vestment moves very pro￿cyclically and is strongly correlated with movements in consumption.
Consequently, the stock of potentially productive knowledge grows steadily during expansions
and comes to a halt during contractions. Note that even if we include the wage costs associ-




























































Figure 4: Incentives to search for commercially viable ideas
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Figure 5: Incentives to undertake R&D
Figure 4 illustrates the factors aﬀecting the incentives to search for commercially viable ideas
and to implement them at each stage of the cycle. During expansions, wages are relatively
high and the subsequent boom far is away. Consequently, the values newly commercialized
ideas lie below the units cost of search eﬀort, whether or not implementation is immediate or
delayed. Eventually, as the next boom approaches, the value of delayed implementation becomes
high enough to warrant the cost of search eﬀort and commercialization starts to pick up. The
value of immediate implementation remains below that of delay because of the risk to pro￿ts of
implementing too early.
Figure 5 illustrates the factors aﬀecting the incentives to undertake R&D at each stage of
the cycle. The ￿value of a new idea￿ corresponds to Ω(t) in the model and ￿implementation
probability￿ refers to the probability that a commercially viable application will be found for
an existing idea prior the subsequent boom. Since commercialization is concentrated during the
contraction, the implementation probability is constant during the expansion. However, as the
contraction proceeds, the likelihood that any new idea created by the R&D sector will ￿nd a
commercially viable application before the next boom falls gradually to 0. Thus, the value of
new ideas grows with the unit cost of generating them (proportional to the knowledge stock)
during the expansion, but then falls with the declining implementation probability during the
contraction.
21Table 2: Comparative Steady States
Parameters Γ ∆X ∆C ￿ z ﬂ g (%) ￿ S P(T)

















































































































































Table 2 details the consequences of varying each of the parameters of the model around the
baseline example. In general, the nature of the cycle is quite sensitive to small parameter changes
and the size of the changes considered is partly dictated by the conditions required for existence.
As noted earlier, changes in technological parameters have no impact on long run growth, but do
aﬀe c tg r o w t hi nt h es h o r tr u na n dt h el e n g t h so fe a c hp h a s eo ft h ec y c l e .
Increases in the commercialization success rate, δ, the size of the work force, L,o rt h es i z eo f
productivity increments, γ, all shorten the length of both phases of the cycle. The length of the
contraction declines because a higher rate of success induces entrepreneurs to want to implement
earlier. Consequently, the size of the productivity boom declines, inducing less R&D and a shorter
expansion. Overall, these adjustments are such that the steady state average growth rate remains
unchanged. In contrast, an increase in the productivity of R&D, ￿, lengthens both phases of the
cycle and increases the size of the boom.
7C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
Several recent theories of endogenous business cycles involve investments in growth￿promoting
activities that are countercyclical. In contrast, empirical observations suggest that one impor-
tant category of these investments, those in R&D, are quite pro￿cyclical. Here we show that
explicitly introducing endogenous R&D investment into the ￿intrinsic business cycle￿ model of
22Francois and Lloyd￿Ellis (2003) yields an inherently pro￿cyclical process. This conclusion is
based on several key assumptions about the characteristics of R&D investment, as the ￿rst step
in a multi￿stage innovative process. In particular, we assume that investments in R&D (1) use
implemented knowledge intensively, (2) are long-term investment with uncertain applications and
(3) are characterized by diminishing returns to existing knowledge.
An interesting feature of the cyclical equilibrium growth path is that the steady state long￿
run growth rate depends only on preferences and not on any technological parameters. This is
in stark contrast to the acyclical equilibrium growth path associated with the same underlying
model. In particular, the long run growth path exhibits no scale eﬀects in the sense that small
changes in the size of the population do not aﬀect the long￿run growth rate. However, the size
of the population does aﬀect the short￿run evolution of the economy and can be important for
existence of the cyclical equilibrium. Moreover, long￿run population growth is not consistent
with a steady state cyclical growth path.
Some features of our model￿s prediction are clearly at odds with the facts. However, it is
possible to extend the model in various ways to address some of these issues. In particular, the
productivity boom and the associated jump in output are rather abrupt. As we show in a recent
paper, Francois and Lloyd￿Ellis (2006), adding capital can help to smooth out the boom to some
extent. Another unrealistic feature of the cyclical process that we generate is that every cycle is
the same and all ￿uctuations are deterministic. Extending the model to allow for some stochastic
elements relaxes some of these strong predictions. In particular, temporary i.i.d. shocks can
change the length and amplitude of each cycle without changing the basic story.
23Appendix
P r o o fo fL e m m a1We show: (1) that if a signal of success from a potential entrepreneur is
credible, other entrepreneurs stop innovation in that sector; (2) given (1) entrepreneurs have no
incentive to falsely claim success.
Part (1): If entrepreneur i0s signal of success is credible then all other entrepreneurs believe that i
has a productivity advantage which is eγ times better than the existing incumbent. If continuing
to innovate in that sector, another entrepreneur will, with positive probability, also develop a
productive advantage of eγ. Such an innovation yields expected pro￿t of 0, since, in developing
their improvement, they do not observe the non-implemented improvements of others, so that
both ￿rms Bertrand compete with the same technology. Returns to attempting innovation in
another sector where there has been no signal of success, or from simply working in production,
w(t) > 0, are thus strictly higher, .
Part (2): If success signals are credible, entrepreneurs know that upon success, further innovation
in their sector will cease from Part (1) by their sending of a costless signal. They are thus
indiﬀerent between falsely signalling success when it has not arrived, and sending no signal.
Thus, there exists a signalling equilibrium in which only successful entrepreneurs send a signal of
success.




so that from (11) Y (t)=xd
i(t)
w(t)
e−γAi(t), but since the intermediate technology is linear (from
(5) this is xs
i(t)=Ai(t)li(t) and xs
i(t)=xd
i(t) in equilibrium) we thus have Y (t)=li(t)
w(t)
e−γ .







e−γ . But the symmetry of sectors implies, again in equilibrium,












P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :There are two possible alternatives which can be ruled out by contradiction.
(1) Suppose instead that at T∗
v, œ Z =0and H =0 . From 33 it follows that œ Ω/Ω = r(T∗








v ), so there would be entry into R&D, contradicting the supposition.
(2) Suppose instead that at T∗
v, œ Z>0 and H>0. Since the wage is constant, free entry into







v), so there would be no entry into R&D, contradicting the second supposition.¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :During the downturn the value of untapped ideas can be expressed as










































œ S(τ)dτ + e−β(t)+lnS(Tv)−lnS(t)Ω(Tv)










P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Since no new ideas emanate form the R&D sector between dates T∗
v
and Tv,i tf o l l o w st h a tΩ(T∗





















































θ Z(Tv).A l s o b y d e ￿nition,

















































































25P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :For an entrepreneur who is holding a commercial viable idea, ηV I(t)
is the value of implementing immediately. Just prior to the boom, when the probability of
displacement is negligible, the value of implementing immediately must equal that of delaying
until the boom:
δηV I(Tv)=δηV D(Tv)=w(Tv). (73)
During the boom, since entrepreneurs prefer to implement immediately, it must be the case that
V I
0 (Tv) >VD
0 (Tv). Thus the return to innovation at the boom is the value of immediate (rather
than delayed) incumbency. It follows that free entry into entrepreneurship at the boom requires
that
δηV I
0 (Tv) ≤ w0(Tv) (74)
The opportunity cost to ￿nancing entrepreneurship is the rate of return on shares in incumbent
￿rms in sectors where no innovation has occurred. Just prior to the boom, this is given by the








Note that since the short￿term interest rate is zero over this phase, β(t)=β(Tv), ∀ t ∈ (T∗
v,T v).







Proof of Proposition 3: The discounted monopoly pro￿ts from owning an innovation at time
Tv is given by
V I







Y (τ)dτ + P(Tv)e−β(Tv−1)V I
0 (Tv)














































Substituting for V I
















dτ + e−Γ(L − Hv)
Ã







26Noting that δηV I
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